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authorJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>2016-01-20 15:00:04 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-01-20 17:09:18 -0800
commitcaaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 (patch)
tree6227530109dd91ab5447fbd2211f09bc636845a7 /fs/proc
parent3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 (diff)
ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c21
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/namespaces.c4
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index d73291f5f0fc..b6c00ce0e29e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
- permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
+ permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 2cf5d7e37375..e665097c1da5 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = {
static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
- struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) {
unsigned int nwords = 0;
do {
@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
wchan = get_wchan(task);
- if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
+ if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)
+ && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
else
seq_putc(m, '0');
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return err;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) {
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
return true;
if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
return true;
- return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
}
@@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
if (task) {
- mm = mm_access(task, mode);
+ mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
@@ -1860,7 +1861,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
if (!task)
goto out_notask;
- mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))
goto out;
@@ -2013,7 +2014,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
goto out;
result = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
goto out_put_task;
result = -ENOENT;
@@ -2066,7 +2067,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
goto out;
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
goto out_put_task;
ret = 0;
@@ -2533,7 +2534,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh
if (result)
return result;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
result = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 1dece8781f91..276f12431dbf 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
if (!task)
return error;
- if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
if (!error)
nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int bufl
if (!task)
return res;
- if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
if (res >= 0)
res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name);