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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-12 10:13:55 -0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-12 10:13:55 -0400
commit5e40d331bd72447197f26525f21711c4a265b6a6 (patch)
treecfbf5efba46b0c5c5b3c8149395f721eab839945 /crypto
parentd0ca47575ab3b41bb7f0fe5feec13c6cddb2913a (diff)
parent594081ee7145cc30a3977cb4e218f81213b63dc5 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris. Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits) integrity: do zero padding of the key id KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer selinux: normalize audit log formatting selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm() KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID ima: detect violations for mmaped files ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement ima: added ima_policy_flag variable ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate() ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init() PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling ...
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c265
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c99
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c90
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c102
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c57
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h8
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c115
11 files changed, 518 insertions, 232 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index a63c551c6557..f97330886d58 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
-int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
+extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
-static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
+static inline
+const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
{
return key->type_data.p[1];
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index eb8cd46961a5..bcbbbd794e1d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
@@ -22,85 +23,209 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
-/*
- * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
- * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID
+ * @val_1: First binary blob
+ * @len_1: Length of first binary blob
+ * @val_2: Second binary blob
+ * @len_2: Length of second binary blob
+ *
+ * Construct an asymmetric key ID from a pair of binary blobs.
*/
-int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
+struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1,
+ size_t len_1,
+ const void *val_2,
+ size_t len_2)
{
- size_t idlen, kidlen;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kid)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ kid->len = len_1 + len_2;
+ memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1);
+ memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2);
+ return kid;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_generate_id);
- if (!kid || !id)
- return 0;
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_id_same - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs are the same.
+ * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare
+ */
+bool asymmetric_key_id_same(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
+{
+ if (!kid1 || !kid2)
+ return false;
+ if (kid1->len != kid2->len)
+ return false;
+ return memcmp(kid1->data, kid2->data, kid1->len) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_same);
- /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
- if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
- id += 3;
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_id_partial - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs
+ * partially match
+ * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare
+ */
+bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)
+{
+ if (!kid1 || !kid2)
+ return false;
+ if (kid1->len < kid2->len)
+ return false;
+ return memcmp(kid1->data + (kid1->len - kid2->len),
+ kid2->data, kid2->len) == 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial);
- /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
- idlen = strlen(id);
- kidlen = strlen(kid);
- if (idlen > kidlen)
- return 0;
+/**
+ * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs
+ * @kids: The list of key IDs to check
+ * @match_id: The key ID we're looking for
+ * @match: The match function to use
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+ bool (*match)(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2))
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!kids || !match_id)
+ return false;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
+ if (match(kids->id[i], match_id))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
- kid += kidlen - idlen;
- if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
- return 0;
+/**
+ * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
+ * @id: The ID as a hex string.
+ */
+struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
+{
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
+ size_t hexlen;
+ int ret;
- return 1;
+ if (!*id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ hexlen = strlen(id);
+ if (hexlen & 1)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!match_id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
+ ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(match_id);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ return match_id;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
/*
- * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
- * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
- *
- * "<desc>" - request a key by description
- * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID
- * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
+ * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on an ID.
*/
-static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description)
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
+ const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
- const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
- const char *spec = description;
- const char *id;
- ptrdiff_t speclen;
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
- if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
- return 0;
+ return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
+ asymmetric_key_id_same);
+}
- /* See if the full key description matches as is */
- if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
- return 1;
+/*
+ * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on an IDs.
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key,
+ const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
- /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
- * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
- */
- id = strchr(spec, ':');
- if (!id)
- return 0;
+ return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id,
+ asymmetric_key_id_partial);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp,
+ * the default will be an exact match on the key description.
+ *
+ * There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key
+ * description:
+ *
+ * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on any available ID
+ * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on any available ID
+ *
+ * These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because
+ * the key is hashed according to its description.
+ */
+static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
+ const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
+ const char *id;
+ bool (*cmp)(const struct key *, const struct key_match_data *) =
+ asymmetric_key_cmp;
- speclen = id - spec;
- id++;
+ if (!spec || !*spec)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
+ spec[1] == 'd' &&
+ spec[2] == ':') {
+ id = spec + 3;
+ cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_partial;
+ } else if (spec[0] == 'e' &&
+ spec[1] == 'x' &&
+ spec[2] == ':') {
+ id = spec + 3;
+ } else {
+ goto default_match;
+ }
- if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
- return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
+ match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(match_id))
+ return PTR_ERR(match_id);
- if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
- memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
- return 1;
+ match_data->preparsed = match_id;
+ match_data->cmp = cmp;
+ match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
+ return 0;
+default_match:
return 0;
}
/*
+ * Free the preparsed the match criterion.
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+ kfree(match_data->preparsed);
+}
+
+/*
* Describe the asymmetric key
*/
static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
- const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
- size_t n;
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ int n;
seq_puts(m, key->description);
@@ -108,13 +233,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
seq_puts(m, ": ");
subtype->describe(key, m);
- if (kid) {
+ if (kids && kids->id[1]) {
+ kid = kids->id[1];
seq_putc(m, ' ');
- n = strlen(kid);
- if (n <= 8)
- seq_puts(m, kid);
- else
- seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
+ n = kid->len;
+ p = kid->data;
+ if (n > 4) {
+ p += n - 4;
+ n = 4;
+ }
+ seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
}
seq_puts(m, " [");
@@ -165,6 +293,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
+ int i;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
@@ -172,7 +302,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
- kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
+ if (kids) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
+ kfree(kids->id[i]);
+ kfree(kids);
+ }
kfree(prep->description);
}
@@ -182,13 +316,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
+
if (subtype) {
subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
module_put(subtype->owner);
key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
}
- kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
- key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
+
+ if (kids) {
+ kfree(kids->id[0]);
+ kfree(kids->id[1]);
+ kfree(kids);
+ key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
+ }
}
struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
@@ -196,10 +337,10 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
.preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse,
.free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse,
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
- .match = asymmetric_key_match,
+ .match_preparse = asymmetric_key_match_preparse,
+ .match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free,
.destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy,
.describe = asymmetric_key_describe,
- .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 3de5fb011de0..751f8fd7335d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -72,11 +72,9 @@ error:
*/
static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = {
.name = "pkcs7_test",
- .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.preparse = pkcs7_preparse,
.free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
- .match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
.destroy = user_destroy,
.describe = user_describe,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 42e56aa7d277..3bd5a1e4c493 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -29,8 +29,25 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
unsigned x509_index;
unsigned sinfo_index;
+ const void *raw_serial;
+ unsigned raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ const void *raw_issuer;
};
+/*
+ * Free a signed information block.
+ */
+static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
+{
+ if (sinfo) {
+ mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
+ kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
+ kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
+ kfree(sinfo);
+ }
+}
+
/**
* pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free
@@ -54,9 +71,7 @@ void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
while (pkcs7->signed_infos) {
sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next;
- mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
- kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
- kfree(sinfo);
+ pkcs7_free_signed_info(sinfo);
}
kfree(pkcs7);
}
@@ -71,51 +86,46 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx;
- struct pkcs7_message *msg;
- long ret;
+ struct pkcs7_message *msg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ int ret;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!msg)
- goto error_no_sig;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
- goto error_no_ctx;
+ goto out_no_ctx;
+ ctx->msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->msg)
+ goto out_no_msg;
ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->sinfo)
- goto error_no_sinfo;
+ goto out_no_sinfo;
- ctx->msg = msg;
ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos;
/* Attempt to decode the signature */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_decode;
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ msg = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ msg = ctx->msg;
+ ctx->msg = NULL;
+
+out:
while (ctx->certs) {
struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs;
ctx->certs = cert->next;
x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
- mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
- kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
- kfree(ctx->sinfo);
+ pkcs7_free_signed_info(ctx->sinfo);
+out_no_sinfo:
+ pkcs7_free_message(ctx->msg);
+out_no_msg:
kfree(ctx);
+out_no_ctx:
return msg;
-
-error_decode:
- mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
- kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest);
- kfree(ctx->sinfo);
-error_no_sinfo:
- kfree(ctx);
-error_no_ctx:
- pkcs7_free_message(msg);
-error_no_sig:
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
@@ -246,10 +256,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
if (IS_ERR(x509))
return PTR_ERR(x509);
- pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
- pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
-
x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
+ pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
+ pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
+
*ctx->ppcerts = x509;
ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
return 0;
@@ -338,8 +348,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
- ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
- ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
+ ctx->raw_serial = value;
+ ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -351,8 +361,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
- ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
- ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ ctx->raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -385,10 +395,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
-
- ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
- *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
- ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
+ ctx->raw_serial_size,
+ ctx->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+ sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
+ sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
+ *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
+ ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->sinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index d25f4d15370f..efc7dc9b8f9c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
unsigned index;
bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
const void *msgdigest;
@@ -33,10 +34,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
const void *authattrs;
/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
- const void *raw_serial;
- unsigned raw_serial_size;
- unsigned raw_issuer_size;
- const void *raw_issuer;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
/* Message signature.
*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index e666eb011a85..1d29376072da 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@
/**
* Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
*/
-int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
+static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
+ if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOPKG [cached]");
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
if (x509->seen) {
if (x509->verified) {
@@ -49,15 +54,18 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
* keys.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
- x509->fingerprint);
- if (!IS_ERR(key))
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
+ false);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
* is apparently the same as one we already trust.
* Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
* the signature on the descendant.
*/
+ pr_devel("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
goto matched;
+ }
if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -77,16 +85,36 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) {
- kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
- return -ENOKEY;
+ if (last && last->authority) {
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
+ false);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+ x509 = last;
+ pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
+ goto matched;
+ }
+ if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+
+ /* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
+ * the signed info directly.
+ */
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ sinfo->signing_cert_id,
+ false);
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
+ sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
+ x509 = NULL;
+ goto matched;
}
+ if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
- last->authority);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
- x509 = last;
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
+ return -ENOKEY;
matched:
ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
@@ -100,10 +128,12 @@ matched:
}
verified:
- x509->verified = true;
- for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
- p->verified = true;
- p->trusted = trusted;
+ if (x509) {
+ x509->verified = true;
+ for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+ p->verified = true;
+ p->trusted = trusted;
+ }
}
sinfo->trusted = trusted;
kleave(" = 0");
@@ -141,24 +171,28 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *p;
- int cached_ret = 0, ret;
+ int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
+ int ret;
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
p->seen = false;
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+ switch (ret) {
+ case -ENOKEY:
+ continue;
+ case -ENOPKG:
+ if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY)
cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
- } else if (ret == -ENOKEY) {
- if (cached_ret == 0)
- cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
- } else {
- return ret;
- }
+ continue;
+ case 0:
+ *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
+ cached_ret = 0;
+ continue;
+ default:
+ return ret;
}
- *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
}
return cached_ret;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index c62cf8006e1f..cd455450b069 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct x509_certificate *x509;
unsigned certix = 1;
- kenter("%u,%u,%u",
- sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
+ kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
@@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
* possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
*/
- if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
- memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
- sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
continue;
pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
sinfo->index, certix);
- if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
- memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
- sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
- pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
- sinfo->index);
- continue;
- }
-
if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
sinfo->index);
@@ -164,9 +153,14 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
sinfo->signer = x509;
return 0;
}
- pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
- sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
- return -ENOKEY;
+
+ /* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in
+ * the trust keyring.
+ */
+ pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
+ sinfo->index,
+ sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -184,15 +178,18 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
p->seen = false;
for (;;) {
- pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
+ pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
+ x509->subject,
+ x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
x509->seen = true;
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
if (x509->authority)
- pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
+ x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
if (!x509->authority ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
@@ -209,7 +206,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
x509->signer = x509;
pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
return 0;
@@ -218,13 +215,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
+ x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
- pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
- if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
- strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
- memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
- x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
+ if (!p->skid)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
goto found_issuer;
}
@@ -233,7 +231,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return 0;
found_issuer:
- pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
+ pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
if (p->seen) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
sinfo->index);
@@ -250,6 +248,17 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
x509 = p;
might_sleep();
}
+
+maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509:
+ /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
+ * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set
+ * sinfo->missing_crypto as the signed info block may still be
+ * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
+ * trusted copy of.
+ */
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG)
+ return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -269,11 +278,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- /* Find the key for the signature */
+ /* Find the key for the signature if there is one */
ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ if (!sinfo->signer)
+ return 0;
+
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
@@ -291,11 +303,33 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ *
+ * Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
+ * matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
+ * of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the
+ * message can be verified.
+ *
+ * This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any
+ * external public keys.
+ *
+ * Returns, in order of descending priority:
+ *
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
+ * appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
+ *
+ * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
+ *
+ * (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
+ * crypto modules couldn't be found, or:
+ *
+ * (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
+ * (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
+ int enopkg = -ENOPKG;
int ret, n;
kenter("");
@@ -304,18 +338,24 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
+ pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
+ n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
}
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+ sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
+ continue;
+ }
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
+ enopkg = 0;
}
- kleave(" = 0");
- return 0;
+ kleave(" = %d", enopkg);
+ return enopkg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 50b3f880b4ff..7525fd183574 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SIG: "fmt
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index ac72348c186a..a668d90302d3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
kfree(cert->issuer);
kfree(cert->subject);
- kfree(cert->fingerprint);
+ kfree(cert->id);
+ kfree(cert->skid);
kfree(cert->authority);
kfree(cert->sig.digest);
mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
long ret;
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
+ /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
+ cert->raw_serial_size,
+ cert->raw_issuer,
+ cert->raw_issuer_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
+ goto error_decode;
+ }
+ cert->id = kid;
+
kfree(ctx);
return cert;
@@ -407,36 +420,36 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
- char *f;
int i;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
- if (vlen < 3)
+ if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
return -EBADMSG;
if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
return -EBADMSG;
v += 2;
vlen -= 2;
- f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!f)
- return -ENOMEM;
- for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
- sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
- pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
- ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
+ ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+ ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_subject,
+ ctx->cert->raw_subject_size,
+ v, vlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ ctx->cert->skid = kid;
+ pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
- size_t key_len;
-
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
- if (vlen < 5)
+ if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
return -EBADMSG;
/* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
@@ -454,7 +467,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
v[3] > vlen - 4)
return -EBADMSG;
- key_len = v[3];
+ vlen = v[3];
v += 4;
} else {
/* Long Form length */
@@ -476,17 +489,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
return -EBADMSG;
- key_len = v[sub + 1];
+ vlen = v[sub + 1];
v += (sub + 2);
}
- f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!f)
- return -ENOMEM;
- for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
- sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
- pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
- ctx->cert->authority = f;
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
+ v, vlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->authority = kid;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 1b76f207c1f3..3dfe6b5d6f0b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
- char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
- char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */
struct tm valid_from;
struct tm valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
@@ -33,10 +34,13 @@ struct x509_certificate {
const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
unsigned raw_subject_size;
+ unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
unsigned index;
bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
bool verified;
bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if can't be verified due to missing crypto */
};
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index f3d62307e6ee..a6c42031628e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "x509_parser.h"
static bool use_builtin_keys;
-static char *ca_keyid;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
#ifndef MODULE
static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
@@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
if (!str) /* default system keyring */
return 1;
- if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
- ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
- else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
+ if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
+ p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
+ if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
+ pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
+ else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+ ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
use_builtin_keys = true;
+ }
return 1;
}
@@ -46,31 +52,35 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
/**
* x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
* @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
- * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
+ * @kid: The key ID.
+ * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
*
* Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
* for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
* certificate that needs to be verified.
*/
struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const char *subject,
- const char *key_id)
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ bool partial)
{
key_ref_t key;
- size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
- char *id;
+ char *id, *p;
- /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
- id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
+ p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!id)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
- id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
- id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
- memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
- id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
+ if (partial) {
+ *p++ = 'i';
+ *p++ = 'd';
+ } else {
+ *p++ = 'e';
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ }
+ *p++ = ':';
+ p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
+ *p = 0;
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
@@ -112,6 +122,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+ if (cert->unsupported_crypto)
+ return -ENOPKG;
if (cert->sig.rsa.s)
return 0;
@@ -124,8 +136,13 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+ cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
@@ -172,6 +189,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
return ret;
ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG)
+ cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
@@ -195,11 +214,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
if (!trust_keyring)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- cert->issuer, cert->authority);
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority,
+ false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
|| test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
@@ -214,9 +233,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
+ const char *q;
size_t srlen, sulen;
- char *desc = NULL;
+ char *desc = NULL, *p;
int ret;
cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
@@ -249,19 +270,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
- if (!cert->fingerprint) {
- pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
- cert->subject);
- ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
- goto error_free_cert;
- }
-
cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
if (!cert->authority ||
- strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
@@ -273,31 +287,52 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Propose a description */
sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
- srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
+ if (cert->raw_skid) {
+ srlen = cert->raw_skid_size;
+ q = cert->raw_skid;
+ } else {
+ srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
+ q = cert->raw_serial;
+ }
+ if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
+ srlen--;
+ q++;
+ }
+
ret = -ENOMEM;
- desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error_free_cert;
- memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
- desc[sulen] = ':';
- desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
- memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
- desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
+ p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
+ p += sulen;
+ *p++ = ':';
+ *p++ = ' ';
+ p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
+ *p = 0;
+
+ kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kids)
+ goto error_free_desc;
+ kids->id[0] = cert->id;
+ kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
- prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
+ prep->type_data[1] = kids;
prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
/* We've finished with the certificate */
cert->pub = NULL;
- cert->fingerprint = NULL;
+ cert->id = NULL;
+ cert->skid = NULL;
desc = NULL;
ret = 0;
+error_free_desc:
+ kfree(desc);
error_free_cert:
x509_free_certificate(cert);
return ret;