KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys

Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
when searching for asymmetric keys.  The following changes are made:

 (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
     key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:

	id: serial number + issuer
	skid: subjKeyId + subject
	authority: authKeyId + issuer

 (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
     asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).

 (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:

     (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:".  The
     	 prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
     	 search for.  The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
     	 recorded on the key.

     (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:".  This will
     	 look for an exact match on the key description.

 (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID.  This is then converted
     into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
     will turn it back into a binary ID.

 (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
     up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
     signature.

 (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
     key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
     block signature.

Additional changes:

 (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
     cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.

 (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone.  This was primarily intended to convey PGP
     public key fingerprints.  If PGP is supported in future, this should
     generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.

 (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
     used to match the authority key ID.  Possibly this should only match the
     actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 33 insertions, 22 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 		public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
 		kfree(cert->issuer);
 		kfree(cert->subject);
-		kfree(cert->fingerprint);
+		kfree(cert->id);
+		kfree(cert->skid);
 		kfree(cert->authority);
 		kfree(cert->sig.digest);
 		mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 {
 	struct x509_certificate *cert;
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
 	long ret;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_decode;
 
+	/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
+	kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
+					 cert->raw_serial_size,
+					 cert->raw_issuer,
+					 cert->raw_issuer_size);
+	if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
+		goto error_decode;
+	}
+	cert->id = kid;
+
 	kfree(ctx);
 	return cert;
 
@@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 			   const void *value, size_t vlen)
 {
 	struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+	struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
 	const unsigned char *v = value;
-	char *f;
 	int i;
 
 	pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
 
 	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
 		/* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
-		if (vlen < 3)
+		if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
 			return -EBADMSG;
 		if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
 			return -EBADMSG;
 		v += 2;
 		vlen -= 2;
 
-		f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!f)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
-			sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
-		pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
-		ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
+						 ctx->cert->raw_subject,
+						 ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
+		if (IS_ERR(kid))
+			return PTR_ERR(kid);
+		ctx->cert->skid = kid;
+		pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
-		size_t key_len;
-
 		/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
-		if (vlen < 5)
+		if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
 			return -EBADMSG;
 
 		/* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
@@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 			    v[3] > vlen - 4)
 				return -EBADMSG;
 
-			key_len = v[3];
+			vlen = v[3];
 			v += 4;
 		} else {
 			/* Long Form length */
@@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 			    v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
 				return -EBADMSG;
 
-			key_len = v[sub + 1];
+			vlen = v[sub + 1];
 			v += (sub + 2);
 		}
 
-		f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!f)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
-			sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
-		pr_debug("authority   %s\n", f);
-		ctx->cert->authority = f;
+		kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
+						 ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
+						 ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
+		if (IS_ERR(kid))
+			return PTR_ERR(kid);
+		pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+		ctx->cert->authority = kid;
 		return 0;
 	}