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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2017-11-07 11:37:07 +0100
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-11-20 08:23:10 +1100
commit020aae3ee58c1af0e7ffc4e2cc9fe4dc630338cb (patch)
treecfe2a7b52894badb8c2a792c241e5a0e6092f56b
parented30b147e1f6e396e70a52dbb6c7d66befedd786 (diff)
ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS
Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters") moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a point where the file descriptor is already opened. This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good values, regardless of the current appraisal status. For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file will be allowed afterwards. Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating security.ima. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index ec7dfa02c051..65fbcf3c32c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -320,6 +320,9 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
return;
+ if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ return;
+
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
if (rc < 0)
return;