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* linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4: (622 commits)
Linux 4.4.166
drm/ast: Remove existing framebuffers before loading driver
s390/mm: Check for valid vma before zapping in gmap_discard
namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
sched/core: Allow __sched_setscheduler() in interrupts when PI is not used
btrfs: Ensure btrfs_trim_fs can trim the whole filesystem
usb: xhci: fix uninitialized completion when USB3 port got wrong status
tty: wipe buffer if not echoing data
tty: wipe buffer.
iwlwifi: mvm: fix regulatory domain update when the firmware starts
scsi: qla2xxx: do not queue commands when unloading
scsi: ufshcd: release resources if probe fails
scsi: ufs: fix race between clock gating and devfreq scaling work
scsi: ufshcd: Fix race between clk scaling and ungate work
scsi: ufs: fix bugs related to null pointer access and array size
netfilter: nf_tables: fix oops when inserting an element into a verdict map
mwifiex: fix p2p device doesn't find in scan problem
mwifiex: Fix NULL pointer dereference in skb_dequeue()
cw1200: Don't leak memory if krealloc failes
Input: xpad - add support for Xbox1 PDP Camo series gamepad
...
Conflicts:
Makefile
arch/x86/Makefile
drivers/base/power/main.c
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c
net/ipv6/route.c
scripts/Kbuild.include
Conflicts in above files are fixed as done in AOSP Change-Id:
I5bd20327e0c1139c46f74e8d5916fa0530a307d3 ("Merge 4.4.165 into android-4.4").
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
Conflicts in above files is due to AOSP Change-Id:
I11cb874d12a7d0921f452c62b0752e0028a8e0a7 ("FROMLIST: arm64: entry: Add
fake CPU feature for unmapping the kernel at EL0"), which needed a minor
rebasing.
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
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commit 58c78e104d937c1f560fb10ed9bb2dcde0db4fcf upstream.
Dalegaard says:
The following ruleset, when loaded with 'nft -f bad.txt'
----snip----
flush ruleset
table ip inlinenat {
map sourcemap {
type ipv4_addr : verdict;
}
chain postrouting {
ip saddr vmap @sourcemap accept
}
}
add chain inlinenat test
add element inlinenat sourcemap { 100.123.10.2 : jump test }
----snip----
results in a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001344
IP: [<ffffffffa07bf704>] nf_tables_check_loops+0x114/0x1f0 [nf_tables]
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa07c2aae>] ? nft_data_init+0x13e/0x1a0 [nf_tables]
[<ffffffffa07c1950>] nft_validate_register_store+0x60/0xb0 [nf_tables]
[<ffffffffa07c74b5>] nft_add_set_elem+0x545/0x5e0 [nf_tables]
[<ffffffffa07bfdd0>] ? nft_table_lookup+0x30/0x60 [nf_tables]
[<ffffffff8132c630>] ? nla_strcmp+0x40/0x50
[<ffffffffa07c766e>] nf_tables_newsetelem+0x11e/0x210 [nf_tables]
[<ffffffff8132c400>] ? nla_validate+0x60/0x80
[<ffffffffa030d9b4>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x354/0x5a7 [nfnetlink]
Because we forget to fill the net pointer in bind_ctx, so dereferencing
it may cause kernel crash.
Reported-by: Dalegaard <dalegaard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 54451f60c8fa061af9051a53be9786393947367c ]
When IDLETIMER rule is added, sysfs file is created under
/sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/
But some label name shouldn't be used.
".", "..", "power", "uevent", "subsystem", etc...
So that sysfs filename checking routine is needed.
test commands:
%iptables -I INPUT -j IDLETIMER --timeout 1 --label "power"
splat looks like:
[95765.423132] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/xt_idletimer/timers/power'
[95765.433418] CPU: 0 PID: 8446 Comm: iptables Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6+ #20
[95765.449755] Call Trace:
[95765.449755] dump_stack+0xc9/0x16b
[95765.449755] ? show_regs_print_info+0x5/0x5
[95765.449755] sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x90
[95765.449755] sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x352/0x500
[95765.449755] sysfs_create_file_ns+0x179/0x270
[95765.449755] ? sysfs_add_file_mode_ns+0x500/0x500
[95765.449755] ? idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x3e5/0xb1b [xt_IDLETIMER]
[95765.449755] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x114/0x130
[95765.449755] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x211/0x2b0
[95765.449755] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[95765.449755] idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x4e2/0xb1b [xt_IDLETIMER]
[ ... ]
Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 886503f34d63e681662057448819edb5b1057a97 ]
Allow /0 as advertised for hash:net,port,net sets.
For "hash:net,port,net", ipset(8) says that "either subnet
is permitted to be a /0 should you wish to match port
between all destinations."
Make that statement true.
Before:
# ipset create cidrzero hash:net,port,net
# ipset add cidrzero 0.0.0.0/0,12345,0.0.0.0/0
ipset v6.34: The value of the CIDR parameter of the IP address is invalid
# ipset create cidrzero6 hash:net,port,net family inet6
# ipset add cidrzero6 ::/0,12345,::/0
ipset v6.34: The value of the CIDR parameter of the IP address is invalid
After:
# ipset create cidrzero hash:net,port,net
# ipset add cidrzero 0.0.0.0/0,12345,0.0.0.0/0
# ipset test cidrzero 192.168.205.129,12345,172.16.205.129
192.168.205.129,tcp:12345,172.16.205.129 is in set cidrzero.
# ipset create cidrzero6 hash:net,port,net family inet6
# ipset add cidrzero6 ::/0,12345,::/0
# ipset test cidrzero6 fe80::1,12345,ff00::1
fe80::1,tcp:12345,ff00::1 is in set cidrzero6.
See also:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200897
https://github.com/ewestbrook/linux/commit/df7ff6efb0934ab6acc11f003ff1a7580d6c1d9c
Signed-off-by: Eric Westbrook <linux@westbrook.io>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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* linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4: (783 commits)
Linux 4.4.159
iw_cxgb4: only allow 1 flush on user qps
HID: sony: Support DS4 dongle
HID: sony: Update device ids
arm64: Add trace_hardirqs_off annotation in ret_to_user
ext4: don't mark mmp buffer head dirty
ext4: fix online resizing for bigalloc file systems with a 1k block size
ext4: fix online resize's handling of a too-small final block group
ext4: recalucate superblock checksum after updating free blocks/inodes
ext4: avoid divide by zero fault when deleting corrupted inline directories
tty: vt_ioctl: fix potential Spectre v1
drm/nouveau/drm/nouveau: Use pm_runtime_get_noresume() in connector_detect()
ocfs2: fix ocfs2 read block panic
scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation
neighbour: confirm neigh entries when ARP packet is received
net: hp100: fix always-true check for link up state
net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT
ipv6: fix possible use-after-free in ip6_xmit()
gso_segment: Reset skb->mac_len after modifying network header
mm: shmem.c: Correctly annotate new inodes for lockdep
...
Conflicts:
Makefile
fs/squashfs/block.c
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
kernel/fork.c
kernel/sys.c
Trivial merge conflicts in above files. Resolved by rebasing
corresponding AOSP changes.
arch/arm64/mm/init.c
Pick the changes from upstream version of AOSP patch
"arm64: check for upper PAGE_SHIFT bits in pfn_valid" instead.
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
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xt_copy_counters_from_user
commit e466af75c074e76107ae1cd5a2823e9c61894ffb upstream.
syzkaller reports an out of bound read in strlcpy(), triggered
by xt_copy_counters_from_user()
Fix this by using memcpy(), then forcing a zero byte at the last position
of the destination, as Florian did for the non COMPAT code.
Fixes: d7591f0c41ce ("netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a53b42c11815d2357e31a9403ae3950517525894 ]
We came across infinite loop in ipvs when using ipvs in docker
env.
When ipvs receives new packets and cannot find an ipvs connection,
it will create a new connection, then if the dest is unavailable
(i.e. IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE), the packet will be dropped sliently.
But if the dropped packet is the first packet of this connection,
the connection control timer never has a chance to start and the
ipvs connection cannot be released. This will lead to memory leak, or
infinite loop in cleanup_net() when net namespace is released like
this:
ip_vs_conn_net_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f31a [ip_vs]
__ip_vs_cleanup at ffffffffa0a9f60a [ip_vs]
ops_exit_list at ffffffff81567a49
cleanup_net at ffffffff81568b40
process_one_work at ffffffff810a851b
worker_thread at ffffffff810a9356
kthread at ffffffff810b0b6f
ret_from_fork at ffffffff81697a18
race condition:
CPU1 CPU2
ip_vs_in()
ip_vs_conn_new()
ip_vs_del_dest()
__ip_vs_unlink_dest()
~IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
cp->dest && !IP_VS_DEST_F_AVAILABLE
__ip_vs_conn_put
...
cleanup_net ---> infinite looping
Fix this by checking whether the timer already started.
Signed-off-by: Tan Hu <tan.hu@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6613b6173dee098997229caf1f3b961c49da75e6 upstream.
When first DCCP packet is SYNC or SYNCACK, we insert a new conntrack
that has an un-initialized timeout value, i.e. such entry could be
reaped at any time.
Mark them as INVALID and only ignore SYNC/SYNCACK when connection had
an old state.
Reported-by: syzbot+6f18401420df260e37ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba062ebb2cd561d404e0fba8ee4b3f5ebce7cbfc upstream.
Three attributes are currently not verified, thus can trigger KMSAN
warnings such as :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nfqnl_recv_config+0x939/0x17d0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:1268
CPU: 1 PID: 4521 Comm: syz-executor120 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1117
__msan_warning_32+0x70/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:620
__arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
__fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
nfqnl_recv_config+0x939/0x17d0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:1268
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb2e/0xc80 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:212
netlink_rcv_skb+0x37e/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
nfnetlink_rcv+0x2fe/0x680 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1680/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x43fd59
RSP: 002b:00007ffde0e30d28 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fd59
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401680
R13: 0000000000401710 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb35/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: fdb694a01f1f ("netfilter: Add fail-open support")
Fixes: 829e17a1a602 ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_queue: allow changing queue length through netlink")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce00bf07cc95a57cd20b208e02b3c2604e532ae8 upstream.
The old code would indefinitely block other users of nf_log_mutex if
a userspace access in proc_dostring() blocked e.g. due to a userfaultfd
region. Fix it by moving proc_dostring() out of the locked region.
This is a followup to commit 266d07cb1c9a ("netfilter: nf_log: fix
sleeping function called from invalid context"), which changed this code
from using rcu_read_lock() to taking nf_log_mutex.
Fixes: 266d07cb1c9a ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function calle[...]")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit adc972c5b88829d38ede08b1069718661c7330ae upstream.
When depth of chain is bigger than NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE, the nft_do_chain
crashes. But there is no need to crash hard here.
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 52f96757905bbf0edef47f3ee6c7c784e7f8ff8a ]
syzkaller reports for buffer overflow for interface name
when starting sync daemons [1]
What we do is that we copy user structure into larger stack
buffer but later we search NUL past the stack buffer.
The same happens for sched_name when adding/editing virtual server.
We are restricted by IP_VS_SCHEDNAME_MAXLEN and IP_VS_IFNAME_MAXLEN
being used as size in include/uapi/linux/ip_vs.h, so they
include the space for NUL.
As using strlcpy is wrong for unsafe source, replace it with
strscpy and add checks to return EINVAL if source string is not
NUL-terminated. The incomplete strlcpy fix comes from 2.6.13.
For the netlink interface reduce the len parameter for
IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_MCAST_IFN and IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME,
so that we get proper EINVAL.
[1]
kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1052!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 373 Comm: syz-executor936 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #45
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c976f800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffffed00392edef6
RBP: ffff8801c976f800 R08: ffff8801cf4c62c0 R09: ffffed003b5e4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R11: ffff8801daf27d87 R12: ffff8801c976fa20
R13: ffff8801c976fae4 R14: ffff8801c976fae0 R15: 000000000000048b
FS: 00007fd99f75e700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200001c0 CR3: 00000001d6843000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
strlen include/linux/string.h:270 [inline]
strlcpy include/linux/string.h:293 [inline]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x31c/0x1d00 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ip_setsockopt+0xd8/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
udp_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2487
ipv6_setsockopt+0x149/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:917
tcp_setsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3057
sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046
__sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447369
RSP: 002b:00007fd99f75dda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e39e4 RCX: 0000000000447369
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e39e0
R13: 75a1ff93f0896195 R14: 6f745f3168746576 R15: 0000000000000001
Code: 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 d2 8f 48 fa eb
de 55 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 60 65 64 88 48 89 e5 e8 91 dd f3 f9 <0f> 0b 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56
RIP: fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: ffff8801c976f800
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+aac887f77319868646df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e4ff67513096 ("ipvs: add sync_maxlen parameter for the sync daemon")
Fixes: 4da62fc70d7c ("[IPVS]: Fix for overflows")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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'name' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of char values.
../net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c:1195:27: warning: address of array
'(*el_dev)->name' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
if (unlikely(!(*el_dev)->name)) {
~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~
Change-Id: If3b25f17829b43e8a639193fb9cd04ae45947200
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
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'ifa_label' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an
array of char values.
../net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c:971:11: warning: address of array
'ifa->ifa_label' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
ifa->ifa_label ? ifa->ifa_label : "(null)");
~~~~~^~~~~~~~~ ~
../net/netfilter/xt_qtaguid.c:972:13: warning: address of array
'ifa->ifa_label' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
if (ifa->ifa_label && !strcmp(ifname, ifa->ifa_label))
~~~~~^~~~~~~~~ ~~
Change-Id: I3c87a5d4b830aaa21a59e9c39cfe0a1d60d7f830
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
|
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* linux-linaro-lsk-v4.4: (515 commits)
Linux 4.4.132
perf/x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for x86_pmu::event_map()
perf/core: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for ->aux_pages[]
perf/x86/msr: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing in the MSR driver
perf/x86/cstate: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for pkg_msr
perf/x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 indexing for hw_perf_event cache_*
tracing/uprobe_event: Fix strncpy corner case
Revert "Bluetooth: btusb: Fix quirk for Atheros 1525/QCA6174"
atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1
net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
can: kvaser_usb: Increase correct stats counter in kvaser_usb_rx_can_msg()
tracing: Fix regex_match_front() to not over compare the test string
libata: Apply NOLPM quirk for SanDisk SD7UB3Q*G1001 SSDs
rfkill: gpio: fix memory leak in probe error path
xfrm_user: fix return value from xfrm_user_rcv_msg
f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
bdi: Fix oops in wb_workfn()
tcp: fix TCP_REPAIR_QUEUE bound checking
perf: Remove superfluous allocation error check
soreuseport: initialise timewait reuseport field
...
Conflicts:
arch/s390/kernel/module.c
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
fs/proc/task_mmu.c
net/ipv6/route.c
Trivial conflicts between AOSP/LSK and backported/rebased LTS changes.
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
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commit 5c64576a77894a50be80be0024bed27171b55989 upstream.
syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2]
We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is
taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure
sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding:
1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release
which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave
the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally,
sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA
deadlock).
2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to
stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave
the mcast group (sock_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock)
they hang.
Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path,
now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes.
Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of
problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and
then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute
sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread.
[1]
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ...
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock:
(rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
but task is already holding lock:
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ...
(rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(rtnl_mutex);
lock(rtnl_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497:
#0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
#1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000703f78e3>]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline]
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431
lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643
inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413
sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595
start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261
udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406
sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x446a69
RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8
R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60
[2]
IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4,
id = 0
IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ...
INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #284
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7 D23688 25421 4408 0x00000004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline]
__schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440
schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499
schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139
kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530
stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154
sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x454889
RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889
RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001
Showing all locks held in the system:
2 locks held by khungtaskd/868:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>]
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline]
#0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60
kernel/hung_task.c:249
#1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [<0000000037c2f8f9>]
debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470
1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247:
#0: (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [<000000000d8d6983>]
__fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765
2 locks held by getty/4338:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4339:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4340:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4341:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4342:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4343:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
2 locks held by getty/4344:
#0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>]
ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365
#1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>]
n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131
3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494:
#0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[<00000000a062b18e>] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline]
#0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline]
#0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646
[inline]
#0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at:
[<00000000a062b18e>] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084
#1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000278427d5>]
process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088
#2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421:
#0: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000d414a689>]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393
2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427:
#0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
#1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e6d48489>]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435:
#0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415:
#0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
net/core/rtnetlink.c:74
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e0b26cc997d5 ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fefa92679dbe0c613e62b6c27235dcfbe9640ad1 ]
If nf_conntrack_htable_size was adjusted by the user during the ct
dump operation, we may invoke nf_ct_put twice for the same ct, i.e.
the "last" ct. This will cause the ct will be freed but still linked
in hash buckets.
It's very easy to reproduce the problem by the following commands:
# while : ; do
echo $RANDOM > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_buckets
done
# while : ; do
conntrack -L
done
# iperf -s 127.0.0.1 &
# iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -P 60 -t 36000
After a while, the system will hang like this:
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [bash:20184]
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [iperf:20382]
...
So at last if we find cb->args[1] is equal to "last", this means hash
resize happened, then we can set cb->args[1] to 0 to fix the above
issue.
Fixes: d205dc40798d ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream.
recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that
name is 0 terminated.
This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/".
Add helper for this and then use it for both.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a2b7cbdd2559aff06cebc28a7150f81c307a90d3 upstream.
Not all parameters passed to ctnetlink_parse_tuple() and
ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple() match the enum type in the signatures of these
functions. Since this is intended change the argument type of to be an
unsigned integer value.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[natechancellor: ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple is still inline]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
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[ Upstream commit 470acf55a021713869b9bcc967268ac90c8a0fac ]
There are two cases which causes refcnt leak.
1. When nf_ct_timeout_ext_add failed in xt_ct_set_timeout, it should
free the timeout refcnt.
Now goto the err_put_timeout error handler instead of going ahead.
2. When the time policy is not found, we should call module_put.
Otherwise, the related cthelper module cannot be removed anymore.
It is easy to reproduce by typing the following command:
# iptables -t raw -A OUTPUT -p tcp -j CT --helper ftp --timeout xxx
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <fgao@ikuai8.com>
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
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commit ae0ac0ed6fcf5af3be0f63eb935f483f44a402d2 upstream.
instead of allocating each xt_counter individually, allocate 4k chunks
and then use these for counter allocation requests.
This should speed up rule evaluation by increasing data locality,
also speeds up ruleset loading because we reduce calls to the percpu
allocator.
As Eric points out we can't use PAGE_SIZE, page_allocator would fail on
arches with 64k page size.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f28e15bacedd444608e25421c72eb2cf4527c9ca upstream.
Keeps some noise away from a followup patch.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4d31eef5176df06f218201bc9c0ce40babb41660 upstream.
On SMP we overload the packet counter (unsigned long) to contain
percpu offset. Hide this from callers and pass xt_counters address
instead.
Preparation patch to allocate the percpu counters in page-sized batch
chunks.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cfc2c740533368b96e2be5e0a4e8c3cace7d9814 upstream.
We had one report from syzkaller [1]
First issue is that INIT_WORK() should be done before mod_timer()
or we risk timer being fired too soon, even with a 1 second timer.
Second issue is that we need to reject too big info->timeout
to avoid overflows in msecs_to_jiffies(info->timeout * 1000), or
risk looping, if result after overflow is 0.
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5129 at kernel/workqueue.c:1444 __queue_work+0xdf4/0x1230 kernel/workqueue.c:1444
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 5129 Comm: syzkaller159866 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #230
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183
__warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547
report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184
fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315
invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:988
RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0xdf4/0x1230 kernel/workqueue.c:1444
RSP: 0018:ffff8801db507538 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8801aeb46080 RBX: ffff8801db530200 RCX: ffffffff81481404
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff86b42640 RDI: 0000000000000082
RBP: ffff8801db507758 R08: 1ffff1003b6a0de5 R09: 000000000000000c
R10: ffff8801db5073f0 R11: 0000000000000020 R12: 1ffff1003b6a0eb6
R13: ffff8801b1067ae0 R14: 00000000000001f8 R15: dffffc0000000000
queue_work_on+0x16a/0x1c0 kernel/workqueue.c:1488
queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:488 [inline]
schedule_work include/linux/workqueue.h:546 [inline]
idletimer_tg_expired+0x44/0x60 net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:116
call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:777 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5e/0xba kernel/locking/spinlock.c:184
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c20173c8 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000282 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 1ffffffff0d592cd RSI: 1ffff10035d68d23 RDI: 0000000000000282
RBP: ffff8801c20173d8 R08: 1ffff10038402e47 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8820e5c8
R13: ffff8801b1067ad8 R14: ffff8801aea7c268 R15: ffff8801aea7c278
__debug_object_init+0x235/0x1040 lib/debugobjects.c:378
debug_object_init+0x17/0x20 lib/debugobjects.c:391
__init_work+0x2b/0x60 kernel/workqueue.c:506
idletimer_tg_create net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:152 [inline]
idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x691/0xb00 net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:213
xt_check_target+0x22c/0x7d0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:850
check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:533 [inline]
find_check_entry.isra.7+0x935/0xcf0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:575
translate_table+0xf52/0x1690 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:744
do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1160 [inline]
do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x370/0x5f0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1686
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ipv6_setsockopt+0x10b/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:927
udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422
sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2976
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829
do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit db57ccf0f2f4624b4c4758379f8165277504fbd7 upstream.
syzbot reported a division by 0 bug in the netfilter nat code:
divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 4168 Comm: syzkaller034710 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #309
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530
net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b2466778 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000f153 RBX: ffff8801b2466dd8 RCX: ffff8801b2466c7c
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801b2466c58 RDI: ffff8801db5293ac
RBP: ffff8801b24667d8 R08: ffff8801b8ba6dc0 R09: ffffffff88af5900
R10: ffff8801b24666f0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000002990f153
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801b2466c7c
FS: 00000000017e3880(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000208fdfe4 CR3: 00000001b5340002 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
dccp_unique_tuple+0x40/0x50 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_dccp.c:30
get_unique_tuple+0xc28/0x1c10 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:362
nf_nat_setup_info+0x1c2/0xe00 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:406
nf_nat_redirect_ipv6+0x306/0x730 net/netfilter/nf_nat_redirect.c:124
redirect_tg6+0x7f/0xb0 net/netfilter/xt_REDIRECT.c:34
ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365
ip6table_nat_do_chain+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:41
nf_nat_ipv6_fn+0x594/0xa80 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:302
nf_nat_ipv6_local_fn+0x33/0x5d0
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:407
ip6table_nat_local_fn+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:69
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483
nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline]
ip6_xmit+0x10ec/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:277
inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139
dccp_transmit_skb+0x9ac/0x10f0 net/dccp/output.c:142
dccp_connect+0x369/0x670 net/dccp/output.c:564
dccp_v6_connect+0xe17/0x1bf0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:946
__inet_stream_connect+0x2d4/0xf00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:620
inet_stream_connect+0x58/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:684
SYSC_connect+0x213/0x4a0 net/socket.c:1639
SyS_connect+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:1620
do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b
RIP: 0033:0x441c69
RSP: 002b:00007ffe50cc0be8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 0000000000441c69
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00000000208fdfe4 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000538 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000403590
R13: 0000000000403620 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 48 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 46 02 00 00 48 8b
45 c8 44 0f b7 20 e8 88 97 04 fd 31 d2 41 0f b7 c4 4c 89 f9 <41> f7 f6 48
c1 e9 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 0f b6 0c 01
RIP: nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530
net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88 RSP: ffff8801b2466778
The problem is that currently we don't have any check on the
configured port range. A port range == -1 triggers the bug, while
other negative values may require a very long time to complete the
following loop.
This commit addresses the issue swapping the two ends on negative
ranges. The check is performed in nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple() since
the nft nat loads the port values from nft registers at runtime.
v1 -> v2: use the correct 'Fixes' tag
v2 -> v3: update commit message, drop unneeded READ_ONCE()
Fixes: 5b1158e909ec ("[NETFILTER]: Add NAT support for nf_conntrack")
Reported-by: syzbot+8012e198bd037f4871e5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 10414014bc085aac9f787a5890b33b5605fbcfc4 upstream.
syzbot reported that xt_LED may try to use the ledinternal->timer
without previously initializing it:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:958!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 1826 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #306
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d24fe9f8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff8801d25246c0 RBX: ffff8801aec6cb50 RCX: ffffffff816052c6
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffbd14b RDI: ffff8801aec6cb68
RBP: ffff8801d24fec98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1ffff1003a49fd6c
R10: ffff8801d24feb28 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8801d24fec70 R14: 00000000fffbd14b R15: ffff8801af608f90
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000206d6fd0 CR3: 0000000006a22001 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
led_tg+0x1db/0x2e0 net/netfilter/xt_LED.c:75
ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365
ip6table_raw_hook+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_raw.c:42
nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline]
nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483
nf_hook.constprop.27+0x3f6/0x830 include/linux/netfilter.h:243
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0xa51/0x1370 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
ndisc_send_ns+0x38a/0x870 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
addrconf_dad_work+0xb9e/0x1320 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4008
process_one_work+0xbbf/0x1af0 kernel/workqueue.c:2113
worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2247
kthread+0x33c/0x400 kernel/kthread.c:238
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:429
Code: 85 2a 0b 00 00 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 75 9f 4c 8b bd 60 fd ff ff e8 bb
57 10 00 65 ff 0d 94 9a a1 7e e9 d9 fc ff ff e8 aa 57 10 00 <0f> 0b e8 a3
57 10 00 e9 14 fb ff ff e8 99 57 10 00 4c 89 bd 70
RIP: __mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline] RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8
RIP: mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102 RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8
---[ end trace f661ab06f5dd8b3d ]---
The ledinternal struct can be shared between several different
xt_LED targets, but the related timer is currently initialized only
if the first target requires it. Fix it by unconditionally
initializing the timer struct.
v1 -> v2: call del_timer_sync() unconditionally, too.
Fixes: 268cb38e1802 ("netfilter: x_tables: add LED trigger target")
Reported-by: syzbot+10c98dc5725c6c8fc7fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a7f1884554b81bd68cd435d72f09a3527629ac43 upstream.
Since 4.4 we erronously use timestamp of the netlink skb (which is zero).
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1066
Fixes: b28b1e826f818c30ea7 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: use y2038 safe timestamp")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When multiple threads is trying to tag/delete the same socket at the
same time, there is a chance the tag_ref_entry of the target socket to
be null before the uid_tag_data entry is freed. It is caused by the
ctrl_cmd_tag function where it doesn't correctly grab the spinlocks
when tagging a socket.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Bug: 65853158
Change-Id: I5d89885918054cf835370a52bff2d693362ac5f0
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Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Conflicts:
fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
Pick changes from AOSP Change-Id: Icd8a85ac0c19a8aa25cd2591a12b4e9b85bdf1c5
("f2fs: catch up to v4.14-rc1")
fs/f2fs/namei.c
Pick changes from AOSP F2FS backport commit 7d5c08fd9194
("f2fs: backport from (4c1fad64 - Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs)")
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commit f6ca9f46f6615c3a87529550058d1b468c0cad89 upstream.
The proc_create() and remove_proc_entry() functions do not reference
their arguments when CONFIG_PROC_FS is disabled, so we get a couple
of warnings about unused variables in IPVS:
ipvs/ip_vs_app.c:608:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3950:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:3994:14: warning: unused variable 'net' [-Wunused-variable]
This removes the local variables and instead looks them up separately
for each use, which obviously avoids the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 4c50a8ce2b63 ("netfilter: ipvs: avoid unused variable warning")
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7dc68e98757a8eccf8ca7a53a29b896f1eef1f76 upstream.
rateest_hash is supposed to be protected by xt_rateest_mutex,
and, as suggested by Eric, lookup and insert should be atomic,
so we should acquire the xt_rateest_mutex once for both.
So introduce a non-locking helper for internal use and keep the
locking one for external.
Reported-by: <syzbot+5cb189720978275e4c75@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 5859034d7eb8 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: add RATEEST target")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit da17c73b6eb74aad3c3c0654394635675b623b3e upstream.
It looks like syzbot found its way into netfilter territory.
Issue here is that @name comes from user space and might
not be null terminated.
Out-of-bound reads happen, KASAN is not happy.
v2 added similar fix for xt_request_find_target(),
as Florian advised.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 889c604fd0b5f6d3b8694ade229ee44124de1127 upstream.
syzkaller triggered OOM kills by passing ipt_replace.size = -1
to IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE. The root cause is that SMP_ALIGN() in
xt_alloc_table_info() causes int overflow and the size check passes
when it should not. SMP_ALIGN() is no longer needed leftover.
Remove SMP_ALIGN() call in xt_alloc_table_info().
Reported-by: syzbot+4396883fa8c4f64e0175@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dc3ee32e96d74dd6c80eed63af5065cb75899299 upstream.
Florian Weber reported:
> Under full load (unshare() in loop -> OOM conditions) we can
> get kernel panic:
>
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
> IP: [<ffffffff81476c85>] nfqnl_nf_hook_drop+0x35/0x70
> [..]
> task: ffff88012dfa3840 ti: ffff88012dffc000 task.ti: ffff88012dffc000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81476c85>] [<ffffffff81476c85>] nfqnl_nf_hook_drop+0x35/0x70
> RSP: 0000:ffff88012dfffd80 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffffffff81add0c0 RCX: ffff88013fd80000
> [..]
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff81474d98>] nf_queue_nf_hook_drop+0x18/0x20
> [<ffffffff814738eb>] nf_unregister_net_hook+0xdb/0x150
> [<ffffffff8147398f>] netfilter_net_exit+0x2f/0x60
> [<ffffffff8141b088>] ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x38/0x60
> [<ffffffff8141b652>] setup_net+0xc2/0x120
> [<ffffffff8141bd09>] copy_net_ns+0x79/0x120
> [<ffffffff8106965b>] create_new_namespaces+0x11b/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff810698a7>] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x57/0xa0
> [<ffffffff8104baa2>] SyS_unshare+0x1b2/0x340
> [<ffffffff81608276>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xa8
> Code: 65 00 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 83 e8 01 48 8b 97 70 12 00 00 48 98 49 89 f4 4c 8b 74 c2 18 4d 8d 6e 08 49 81 c6 88 00 00 00 <49> 8b 5d 00 48 85 db 74 1a 48 89 df 4c 89 e2 48 c7 c6 90 68 47
>
The simple fix for this requires a new pernet variable for struct
nf_queue that indicates when it is safe to use the dynamically
allocated nf_queue state.
As we need a variable anyway make nf_register_queue_handler and
nf_unregister_queue_handler pernet. This allows the existing logic of
when it is safe to use the state from the nfnetlink_queue module to be
reused with no changes except for making it per net.
The syncrhonize_rcu from nf_unregister_queue_handler is moved to a new
function nfnl_queue_net_exit_batch so that the worst case of having a
syncrhonize_rcu in the pernet exit path is not experienced in batch
mode.
Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
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commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os
vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d
These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS
fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4b380c42f7d00a395feede754f0bc2292eebe6e5 upstream.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
$ nfct helper list
nfct v1.4.4: netlink error: Operation not permitted
$ vpnns -- nfct helper list
{
.name = ftp,
.queuenum = 0,
.l3protonum = 2,
.l4protonum = 6,
.priv_data_len = 24,
.status = enabled,
};
Add capable() checks in nfnetlink_cthelper, as this is cleaner than
trying to generalize the solution.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 444f901742d054a4cd5ff045871eac5131646cfb upstream.
on SIP requests, so a fragmented TCP SIP packet from an allow header starting with
INVITE,NOTIFY,OPTIONS,REFER,REGISTER,UPDATE,SUBSCRIBE
Content-Length: 0
will not bet interpreted as an INVITE request. Also Request-URI must start with an alphabetic character.
Confirm with RFC 3261
Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF
Fixes: 30f33e6dee80 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: support method specific request/response handling")
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <ulrich.weber@riverbed.com>
Acked-by: Marco Angaroni <marcoangaroni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 95a8d19f28e6b29377a880c6264391a62e07fccc upstream.
In case nf_conntrack_tuple_taken did not find a conflicting entry
check that all entries in this hash slot were tested and restart
in case an entry was moved to another chain.
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: ea781f197d6a ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu()")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 00a3101f561816e58de054a470484996f78eb5eb upstream.
Like NFQNL_MSG_VERDICT_BATCH do, we should also reject the verdict
request when the portid is not same with the initial portid(maybe
from another process).
Fixes: 97d32cf9440d ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: batch verdict support")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit b173a28f62cf929324a8a6adcc45adadce311d16 upstream.
The 'name' filed in struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy{} is not a
pointer, so check it is NULL or not will always return true. Even if the
name is empty, slash will always be displayed like follows:
# cat /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect
297 l3proto = 2 proto=6 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=1 dport=1025 ftp/
^
Fixes: 3a8fc53a45c4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: allocate 16 bytes for the helper and policy names")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def upstream.
The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
several minutes.
sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
echo "*filter"
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
done
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
done
echo COMMIT
[ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
(gave up after 10 minutes)
Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation).
[1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
Reported-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/fork.c
Conflict due to Kaiser implementation in LTS 4.4.110.
net/ipv4/raw.c
Minor conflict due to LTS commit
be27b620a861 ("net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg")
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[ Upstream commit 77c1c03c5b8ef28e55bb0aff29b1e006037ca645 ]
We must call security_release_secctx to free the memory returned by
security_secid_to_secctx, otherwise memory may be leaked forever.
Fixes: ef493bd930ae ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: add security context information")
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 83d90219a5df8d950855ce73229a97b63605c317 ]
The nf_ct_helper_hash table is protected by nf_ct_helper_mutex, while
nfct_helper operation is protected by nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER).
So it's possible that one CPU is walking the nf_ct_helper_hash for
cthelper add/get/del, another cpu is doing nf_conntrack_helpers_unregister
at the same time. This is dangrous, and may cause use after free error.
Note, delete operation will flush all cthelpers added via nfnetlink, so
using rcu to do protect is not easy.
Now introduce a dummy list to record all the cthelpers added via
nfnetlink, then we can walk the dummy list instead of walking the
nf_ct_helper_hash. Also, keep nfnl_cthelper_dump_table unchanged, it
may be invoked without nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER) held.
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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