diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/spice')
8 files changed, 12 insertions, 294 deletions
diff --git a/package/spice/0001-Prevent-possible-DoS-attempts-during-protocol-handsh.patch b/package/spice/0001-Prevent-possible-DoS-attempts-during-protocol-handsh.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 57a64d96b7..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0001-Prevent-possible-DoS-attempts-during-protocol-handsh.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake - -The limit for link message is specified using a 32 bit unsigned integer. -This could cause possible DoS due to excessive memory allocations and -some possible crashes. -For instance a value >= 2^31 causes a spice_assert to be triggered in -async_read_handler (reds-stream.c) due to an integer overflow at this -line: - - int n = async->end - async->now; - -This could be easily triggered with a program like - - #!/usr/bin/env python - - import socket - import time - from struct import pack - - server = '127.0.0.1' - port = 5900 - - s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) - s.connect((server, port)) - data = pack('<4sIII', 'REDQ', 2, 2, 0xaaaaaaaa) - s.send(data) - - time.sleep(1) - -without requiring any authentication (the same can be done -with TLS). - -[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578] -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index f40b65c1..86a33d53 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque) - - reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version; - -- if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) { -+ /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */ -+ if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) { - reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); - spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size); - reds_link_free(link); --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch b/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5bf9b89d17..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflows in capability checks - -The limits for capabilities are specified using 32 bit unsigned integers. -This could cause possible integer overflows causing buffer overflows. -For instance the sum of num_common_caps and num_caps can be 0 avoiding -additional checks. -As the link message is now capped to 4096 and the capabilities are -contained in the link message limit the capabilities to 1024 -(capabilities are expressed in number of uint32_t items). - -[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578] -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 8 ++++++++ - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index 86a33d53..91504544 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque) - link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps); - link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps); - -+ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities, -+ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */ -+ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) { -+ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); -+ reds_link_free(link); -+ return; -+ } -+ - num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps; - caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset); - --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/0003-main-channel-Prevent-overflow-reading-messages-from-.patch b/package/spice/0003-main-channel-Prevent-overflow-reading-messages-from-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f602d5f3b1..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0003-main-channel-Prevent-overflow-reading-messages-from-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client - -Caller is supposed the function return a buffer able to store -size bytes. - -[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9577] -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/main_channel.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c -index 0ecc9df8..1fc39155 100644 ---- a/server/main_channel.c -+++ b/server/main_channel.c -@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc, - - if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) { - return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size); -+ } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) { -+ /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */ -+ return NULL; - } else { - return main_chan->recv_buf; - } --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/0004-reds-Disconnect-when-receiving-overly-big-ClientMoni.patch b/package/spice/0004-reds-Disconnect-when-receiving-overly-big-ClientMoni.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 070259f2bb..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0004-reds-Disconnect-when-receiving-overly-big-ClientMoni.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -From f1e7ec03e26ab6b8ca9b7ec060846a5b706a963d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big - ClientMonitorsConfig - -Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is -a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig -message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the -non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily -lead to memory exhaustion on the host. - -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index f439a366..7be85fdf 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void) - static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) - { -+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256; -+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE = -+ sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); -+ - VDAgentMessage *msg_header; - VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; - RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; - -+ // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through -+ // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows -+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - cmc->buffer_size += size; - cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size); - spice_assert(cmc->buffer); - cmc->mcc = mcc; - memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size); - cmc->buffer_pos += size; -+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) { -+ spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); -+ return; -+ } - msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer; -- if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size || -- msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { -+ if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } -+ if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { - spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); - return; - } -@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); - reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); -+ return; -+ -+overflow: -+ spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting"); -+ red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc)); -+ reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); - } - - void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/0005-reds-Avoid-integer-overflows-handling-monitor-config.patch b/package/spice/0005-reds-Avoid-integer-overflows-handling-monitor-config.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 98740520c1..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0005-reds-Avoid-integer-overflows-handling-monitor-config.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From ec6229c79abe05d731953df5f7e9a05ec9f6df79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor - configuration - -Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows. - -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index 7be85fdf..e1c8c108 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); - return; - } -+ if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch b/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 212645b44f..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From a957a90baf2c62d31f3547e56bba7d0e812d2331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor - configuration - -It was also possible for a malicious client to set -VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger -than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors. -This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to -read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the -host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems -complicated. - -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index e1c8c108..3a42c375 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - VDAgentMessage *msg_header; - VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; - RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; -+ uint32_t max_monitors; - - // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through - // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows -@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - goto overflow; - } - monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); -+ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows -+ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) / -+ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); -+ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); - reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); --- -2.11.0 - diff --git a/package/spice/spice.hash b/package/spice/spice.hash index c9b591f41d..1a25926ab2 100644 --- a/package/spice/spice.hash +++ b/package/spice/spice.hash @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # Locally calculated -sha256 f901a5c5873d61acac84642f9eea5c4d6386fc3e525c2b68792322794e1c407d spice-0.12.8.tar.bz2 +sha256 1ead5de63d06eededed4017db37240f07bef0abffbaf621899647e7e685a1519 spice-0.14.1.tar.bz2 diff --git a/package/spice/spice.mk b/package/spice/spice.mk index 7b09f39fe7..16e57441a8 100644 --- a/package/spice/spice.mk +++ b/package/spice/spice.mk @@ -4,13 +4,14 @@ # ################################################################################ -SPICE_VERSION = 0.12.8 +SPICE_VERSION = 0.14.1 SPICE_SOURCE = spice-$(SPICE_VERSION).tar.bz2 -SPICE_SITE = http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases +SPICE_SITE = http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/spice-server SPICE_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+ SPICE_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING SPICE_INSTALL_STAGING = YES SPICE_DEPENDENCIES = \ + host-pkgconf \ jpeg \ libglib2 \ openssl \ @@ -20,9 +21,9 @@ SPICE_DEPENDENCIES = \ # We disable everything for now, because the dependency tree can become # quite deep if we try to enable some features, and I have not tested that. SPICE_CONF_OPTS = \ + --disable-gstreamer \ --disable-opengl \ --disable-smartcard \ - --disable-automated-tests \ --without-sasl \ --disable-manual @@ -42,6 +43,13 @@ else SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --disable-lz4 endif +ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_OPUS),y) +SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --enable-opus +SPICE_DEPENDENCIES += opus +else +SPICE_CONF_OPTS += --disable-opus +endif + # no enable/disable, detected using pkg-config ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_OPUS),y) SPICE_DEPENDENCIES += opus |