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2016-06-15kernel/kcov: unproxify debugfs file's fopsNicolai Stange
Since commit 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data"), a debugfs file's file_operations methods get proxied through lifetime aware wrappers. However, only a certain subset of the file_operations members is supported by debugfs and ->mmap isn't among them -- it appears to be NULL from the VFS layer's perspective. This behaviour breaks the /sys/kernel/debug/kcov file introduced concurrently with commit 5c9a8750a640 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage"). Since that file never gets removed, there is no file removal race and thus, a lifetime checking proxy isn't needed. Avoid the proxying for /sys/kernel/debug/kcov by creating it via debugfs_create_file_unsafe() rather than debugfs_create_file(). Fixes: 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data") Fixes: 5c9a8750a640 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage") Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-04-28kcov: don't profile branches in kcovAndrey Ryabinin
Profiling 'if' statements in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() leads to unbound recursion and crash: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() -> ftrace_likely_update -> __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() ... Define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING to disable this tracer. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-28kcov: don't trace the code coverage codeJames Morse
Kcov causes the compiler to add a call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() in every basic block. Ftrace patches in a call to _mcount() to each function it has annotated. Letting these mechanisms annotate each other is a bad thing. Break the loop by adding 'notrace' to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() so that ftrace won't try to patch this code. This patch lets arm64 with KCOV and STACK_TRACER boot. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22kernel: add kcov code coverageDmitry Vyukov
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>