diff options
author | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> | 2015-09-04 16:23:01 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> | 2016-06-01 16:58:48 -0700 |
commit | fe01f56c0d5c42508e1e82f5976e4c10bb00f632 (patch) | |
tree | 7d81fbab5bf86c98c63ab37b849e6121df4843dc | |
parent | 0eb24e1bc7317eb5764567223cdd9405d16aefa7 (diff) |
add a property for controlling perf_event_paranoid
(Cherry picked from commit 2b22a66382db8a2fdf5ed7a685085a6d7d67cf12)
This adds a system property for controlling unprivileged access to
perf_event_paranoid. It depends on adding kernel support for
perf_event_paranoid=3 based on grsecurity's PERF_HARDEN feature to
completely disable unprivileged access to perf. A minimal port of this
feature is used in the vanilla Debian kernel by default.
It hides the non-hardened value as an implementation detail, since while
it is currently 1, it will probably become 2 in the future.
Bug: 29054680
Change-Id: I6e3ae3cf18d8c76df94f879c34fb6fde519b89a9
-rw-r--r-- | rootdir/init.rc | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rootdir/init.rc b/rootdir/init.rc index 00b9844b6..3466dce0c 100644 --- a/rootdir/init.rc +++ b/rootdir/init.rc @@ -603,6 +603,11 @@ on property:sys.sysctl.extra_free_kbytes=* on property:sys.sysctl.tcp_def_init_rwnd=* write /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_default_init_rwnd ${sys.sysctl.tcp_def_init_rwnd} +on property:security.perf_harden=0 + write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 1 + +on property:security.perf_harden=1 + write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 3 ## Daemon processes to be run by init. ## |